Answer: Juche is North
Korea’s version of communism.
Basically, it is Marxist-Leninism with an exaggerated overlay of
animosity to anything foreign. This is not as weird as it sounds when
you consider that Korean history has been a catalogue of bullying by
and kowtowing to foreign powers. Kim Il-sung kind of said “Up Yours!”
to the outside world. One example
of how this works in practice is that North Koreans omit to tell their
own people that they were saved from defeat by China
during the Korean War. There is a Chinese war memorial in the country,
but only Chinese tourists get to go and see it. A good example of the
skill with which North Koreans execute Juche policy is in their
aid-gathering
techniques. They will, for example, try to gain aid from the US, South
Korea and Japan by agreeing not to behave badly – i.e. giving up the
nuclear
program – and then tell their own people that their “enemies” are
providing
rice to atone for their crimes against North Korea. A lot of people in South
Korea,
who feel that their own country has progressed by “obeying” America,
have a sneaking admiration for this type of aggressive panhandling.
Question 3: In your book you note that historically Confucian
thought has had a tremendous influence on Korea, both North and South,
and
further note that the Confucian concept of five stratum’s of society
– Yangban, Chung-in, Sang-in, Chonmin and Slaves is in some respects
still active in North Korea (page 18), could you explain this concept
and how it operates in North Korea today?
Answer: For all its virtues in encouraging the
contemplation of ethical matters over all else, Confucianism in
practice encouraged
social engineering in its worst form. As you’ve noted, the caste system
of old Korea
was one expression of this. It has its echoes in modern North
Korea. Some years ago, the regime
decided to classify the entire population into three broad categories
of friendly, wavering and hostile, according to perceived loyalty to
the regime. Having a grandfather who was a landlord who fled to South
Korea was enough to make you a
“hostile.” These categories were further sub-divided into more precise
classifications. Your classification determines your future prospects,
whether your children get to go to college, what level of punishment
you receive if convicted
of a crime, and so on. But let’s not be too harsh on Confucius. Such a
mindless system derives from the typical communist ideologically-driven
fear of the enemy within and right now explains why the regime has to
cling to power – if it loosens its grip, those who have been put in the
lower categories and who have suffered as a result will rise up in
bloody
vengeance.
Question 4: You note that North Korea has the World’s
third-biggest army and spends over US $5 Billion yearly, nearly one
third (over
31.3%) of its GDP, on Nation Defense (pg. 34-35), and you note later
in the book that a war in Korea could kill a million people and take
up to 100,000 US lives but you also don’t
seem
to have much regard for the quality of the North Korean military forces
vis-à-vis the South and the U.S., could you explain this further?
Answer: The proportion of total resources spent
on defense is remarkable. But the economy is so bad that the actual
amount
is not enough to put fuel in jets for training or to properly maintain
the army. I wonder whether a repeat of the conventional invasion which
started the Korean War in 1950 would not collapse at the first decent
restaurant
in South Korea.
The danger – and the potential casualty figures you mention are
Pentagon
estimates – lies in the unconventional component – highly trained
Special
Forces, and chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Unleashed, these
would
cause horrible damage.
Question 5: You discuss in Chapters six and seven many aspects
of Kim Jong-il and his personality and come to a conclusion that the
man is neither insane nor evil. The
popular
belief is quite different I suspect. Could
you tell us briefly how you came to conclude this and do you feel this
same belief is shared by the U.S. and South Korean governments?
Answer: I loathe dictatorship and come down very
hard on North Korea.
It would seem logical, then, that I would try to argue that Kim Jong-il
is evil or nuts. But I find such an automatic conclusion to be rather
shallow. Life is more complex. The US
view is that Kim is a “malignant narcissist.” In other words, he’s the
worst kind of freak imaginable. My view is closer to the South Korean
understanding. While I think Kim Jong-Il should take responsibility for
the evil system he presides over –he should be fired immediately and
put
on trial – I do not think he is an evil man. He is not personally
violent;
he doesn’t pull the wings off butterflies. He is no Uday Hussein. If
anything,
he is a rather artistic character. He is shrewdly hand-on in some
areas,
and rather remote in others. But I do not believe that he is personally
violent, nor that he delights in the misery of others. Such a man would
be truly evil.
Question 6: In your book (page 255 and elsewhere), you note that
South Korea and most probably the U.S. and Japan are not interested in
a collapse of North Korea similar to what happened in Germany. The South
Korea and the U.S. have seemed to call out for such a result in the past. Has this now changed and if so could you
explain why?
Answer: No one wants North
Korea to collapse. In particular, the
South Korean government and populace appears to be so terrified of the
economic and social consequences of collapse that people are unwilling
to even talk about it, as if openly discussing it might cause it to
happen.
What South Korea
wants is for the North Korean regime to reform in the Chinese manner
and
develop the country’s economy. The inevitable re-unification can then
happen
at some safe time in the future. I do not believe that the US
government has really thought this thru. The US
position is to avoid war.
Question 7:
In Chapter 11, you talk of the number of
projects that have been tabled in North Korea to develop industrial
zones, free
trade zones, etc. but on Page 164 you note “In contrast to China,
whose investment in infrastructure has given confidence to foreign
investors, the most North Korea is doing is providing land. South
Korea is paying for the
infrastructure. For now, that is the
extent of change in North Korea. Until there’s more
change, it’s difficult to imagine any of these projects really taking
off.” Could you explain this observation
and give
examples of some of the projects that have been proposed and their
current situation?
